Sri Lanka Aviation

Thanks for the update! Do we know which Russian cities Red Wings will fly from to Sri Lanka? Will they choose to fly to CMB or HRI?

Also, do we have any updates on Air Cairo, Iran Air Tour and Arkia flying to Sri Lanka?

Air Japan ceased operations as a standalone carrier on the 28th of March, 2026 and was integrated into ANA, someone please correct me if I'm wrong.

I believe the minister refering to Japan Airlines? Or ANA? Can someone confirm?

Anyways, this is extremely good news, I've heard that MEL-CMB route on JQ is doing exceptionally well and is being booked out. JQ is exploring expanding flights to CMB, maybe 4-5 weekly soon if the demand is good. I also saw that a representative of Qantas was with the delegation who met with the Sri Lankan aviation authorities, might be that Qantas is considering operations to Sri Lanka based on the success of Jetstar.

Thanks

https://www.dailymirror.lk/business-...ce=chatgpt.com

Good news guys, Redwings is considering flights to Sri Lanka. Hopefully we will hear about this soon.

The SriLankan A350 deal: Yes, it was corrupt, but was the aircraft choice actually wrong?


13 Sep 2026 | By Shyam Ranasinghe




Let me begin with what should be beyond dispute: corruption in public procurement is indefensible.

Anyone who solicited, paid, facilitated, or knowingly benefited from bribes connected with SriLankan Airlines’ aircraft acquisition should be investigated and, where the evidence supports it, prosecuted and punished. Nothing in this article excuses corruption, defends any political figure, or diminishes what occurred.

The Airbus transactions damaged public finances, SriLankan Airlines’ reputation, and confidence in Government decision-making. As colossal sums of public money were involved in this endeavour, Sri Lanka deserves a complete accounting of how the deal was structured, who influenced it, and who benefited.

This story, however, contains two major decisions. Firstly, the acquisition, and secondly, the subsequent cancellation of the A350 commitments. The corrupt circumstances surrounding the first have received considerable attention. The technical and financial reasoning behind the second has received far less scrutiny.

A corrupt procurement process does not automatically make the selected aircraft technically unsuitable. An aircraft does not become inefficient, incapable, or commercially inappropriate because corruption influenced its acquisition. The legality of the transaction and the suitability of the aircraft are separate questions.

SriLankan’s fleet-renewal programme combined the A330-300 with the newer A350-900, intended for higher-demand services and possible future markets requiring greater range, payload capability, and fuel efficiency. Following the change of government, the A350 commitments were unwound during 2016–2017, reportedly on consultancy advice that the aircraft was too large, expensive, or unsuitable for the airline.

Once SriLankan had committed to the A350, however, the question was whether accepting the aircraft – or deferring, renegotiating, or subleasing them – offered a better outcome than cancellation. That required a transparent, route-by-route comparison of fuel burn, capacity, cargo revenue, payload-range performance, utilisation, maintenance, financing, and residual value. It also required accounting for cancellation payments, replacement aircraft, lost contractual value, and foregone network opportunities.

Corruption may understandably have created political pressure to dismantle the transaction. But political repudiation is not necessarily sound fleet planning. If cancellation relied on incomplete assumptions or inadequate analysis, one damaging decision may have been followed by another.

Punishing corruption and questioning the cancellation are not contradictory. Genuine accountability requires scrutiny of both decisions.

Why did SriLankan select the A350?

When the Emirates management arrangement ended in 2008, SriLankan entered a difficult period of State management, growing losses, and strategic uncertainty.

Its long-haul fleet still depended on ageing four-engined A340-300s. These aircraft had served the airline well, but rising fuel and maintenance costs made their replacement inevitable.

The 2013 fleet-renewal programme included A330-300s for the existing medium- and long-haul network and A350-900s to provide greater range, payload, and future growth capability. Four A350s were purchased directly from Airbus, while another four were arranged through lessors.

After the change of government in 2015, the strategy changed. SriLankan was instructed to restructure and pursue break-even within two years. Paris and Frankfurt were selected for suspension, the planned widebody fleet was reduced, and the four leased A350s were cancelled during 2016.

SriLankan was unquestionably in financial difficulty. But that does not, by itself, prove that the A350 was the wrong aircraft.

This was not merely a larger A330

The A350-900 was a clean-sheet design built around the Rolls-Royce Trent XWB engine, a new-generation wing and an airframe made extensively from carbon-fibre composite and titanium.

Approximately 53% of its structure is carbon-fibre-reinforced polymer, while more than 70% consists of advanced materials. This reduces structural weight and exposure to corrosion and fatigue, with corresponding benefits for fuel consumption and long-term maintenance.

This would have also been the first such occasion where SriLankan Engineering would have welcomed this technology onto our shores, thereby elevating the technical competence of the entire aeronautical engineering industry of the country.

Its wing incorporates advanced aerodynamic features, including variable camber in cruise, while the Trent XWB was designed specifically for the aircraft. Airbus claims approximately 25% lower fuel burn and emissions compared with previous-generation aircraft in the same broad market category.

Manufacturer claims must always be tested against an airline’s actual route, configuration, and utilisation. But the A350’s underlying engineering advantages are real.

The current A350-900 has a published range of approximately 8,600 nautical miles. The A330-300 is published at approximately 6,350 nautical miles.

That difference would have given SriLankan options that its present A330-300 fleet cannot provide comfortably:

• Colombo–Auckland: approximately 5,900 nautical miles
• Colombo–Toronto: approximately 7,560 nautical miles
• Colombo–New York JFK: approximately 7,590 nautical miles

These figures do not prove that such routes would be profitable. They show that the A350 could create markets that are operationally beyond the realistic year-round capability of the A330-300.

What about routes already operated by the A330?

An important question is whether the A350 would have been inefficient when deployed on routes already served by the A330-300.

Not necessarily. The A350 would usually have a higher trip cost because it is a larger aircraft with a higher financing cost. But airlines do not evaluate aircraft purely by asking which one produces the cheapest individual flight. They also consider the following:

• Fuel consumed per passenger
• Cost per available seat-kilometre
• Passenger and cargo revenue
• Payload restrictions
• Maintenance costs
• Aircraft utilisation
• The number of passengers displaced when a flight is full

If there were sufficient demand for London, Melbourne, or Narita, the A350 could have been the more prudent aircraft.

An A330-300 might carry approximately 297 passengers in SriLankan configuration, while an A350-900 could accommodate around 330 or more in a sensible long-haul layout. If demand was only 240 passengers, the A330 would probably be preferable.

However, if demand was 310 passengers, the calculation changes. The A350 could carry passengers the A330 would leave behind, provide more baggage and cargo capacity, and spread its trip cost over more revenue-producing seats.

The lower trip cost of the A330 could then become a false economy.

London presents a particularly credible case because of its established year-round demand, diaspora traffic, tourism, business travel, baggage volumes, and connecting passengers.

Melbourne is also a strong candidate. Its distance allows the A350’s aerodynamic and engine efficiency to work over many hours of cruise, while its superior payload-range capability could provide greater flexibility in adverse winds.

Narita would be more finely balanced because it is a shorter sector. But where passenger and cargo demand approached A330 capacity, an A350 could still offer lower unit costs and higher total contribution.

The correct question was therefore not simply as to whether the A350 was more expensive to fly than the A330. It should have been, ‘Does the A350’s fuel efficiency, additional capacity, cargo contribution, and payload capability generate more value than its higher ownership and trip cost?’

The financial problem cannot be ignored

SriLankan reportedly expected to pay approximately $ 1.425 million per month for each leased A350, compared with about $ 1 million for an A330-300.

That meant an additional fixed cost of approximately $ 425,000 per aircraft per month – or $ 5.1 million annually.

For four aircraft, the lease premium alone approached $ 20.4 million per year.

The A350’s fuel savings, maintenance savings, and additional revenue would therefore have been needed to overcome this difference, together with the cost of training, simulators, spares, engineering support, and establishing a new fleet.

That is a serious hurdle. But it demonstrates that the central problem may have been the price and structure of the transaction – not the engineering suitability of the aircraft.

A badly financed efficient aircraft can be commercially worse than a well-financed older aircraft. That condemns the financing arrangement, not necessarily the aircraft selection.

Was the consultancy question too narrow?

Public records indicate that Skyworks found the A350 unsuitable for “the flight schedule evaluated”. Nyras reportedly compared the A350 against the A330-300 on substantially the same routes.

This is where I believe the rationale deserves closer examination.

If Paris and Frankfurt had already been selected for withdrawal, and Toronto, New York, or Auckland were not seriously modelled, the conclusion was almost built into the exercise: remove the routes that exploit the A350’s range, compare it with the A330 on the remaining routes, and then conclude that it is unnecessary.

Even on those existing routes, a comparison based primarily on trip cost could miss the A350’s lower unit costs, additional passenger revenue, cargo capability, and reduced payload restrictions.

Frankfurt and Paris were subsequently restored. Melbourne and Sydney developed into important long-haul destinations. Emirates, Qatar Airways, and Singapore Airlines have deployed A350s to Colombo, including on sectors much shorter than the aircraft’s maximum range.

Those airlines have larger hubs and different cost structures, so their operations do not prove that SriLankan’s A350 contracts were viable. They do, however, challenge the suggestion that the aircraft itself was inherently unsuitable for Colombo or for medium-to-long-haul services.

Two truths can coexist

None of this means SriLankan should automatically have accepted all eight A350s.

Eight aircraft may have been excessive. The lease rates appear extremely high. The contracts lacked adequate protection. A small subfleet would also have introduced additional training, engineering, spares, and financing costs.

A more responsible strategy might have begun with two or three A350-900s, phased the deliveries, and retained options for further aircraft once demand was demonstrated.

The A350s could then have been concentrated along the London, Melbourne, and other high-demand routes, while preserving the ability to explore Toronto, New York, or Auckland.

The full consultancy reports and their underlying financial models are still not readily available to the public. Until they are examined, several questions remain:

• Which routes and demand forecasts were evaluated?
• Were the A350s treated as additions or replacements for older A330s?
• Were passenger spill, cargo revenue, and payload restrictions included?
• Were Toronto, New York, and Auckland properly considered?
• Was the final cancellation package compared with deferment, renegotiation, or partial induction?
• Did the consultants distinguish the aircraft’s economics from SriLankan’s unusually expensive contractual terms?

I have prepared this analysis entirely from open-source information available in the public domain. I have not had access to the complete Nyras, Skyworks, or Seabury reports, their underlying financial models, or all the commercial documents considered by the airline and the Government.

I therefore do not present my conclusion as the final word. If any stakeholder or anyone possessing reliable evidence can demonstrate that any of my assumptions or conclusions are incorrect, I welcome that information and stand ready to correct the analysis publicly.

The purpose is not to defend a corrupt transaction. It is to ensure that accountability for corruption is kept separate from an objective assessment of aircraft engineering, flight operations, network strategy, and finance.

The corruption must be pursued without fear or favour. But punishing corruption does not require us to abandon sound technical analysis.

The deal may have been corrupt. The contracts may have been disastrous. Eight aircraft may have been too many.

But none of those facts, by themselves, proves that the A350-900 was the wrong aircraft for SriLankan Airlines.

It may instead show that the right aircraft was acquired in the wrong quantity, at the wrong price, through the wrong process – and then evaluated against a strategy too narrow to use it properly.

Sri Lanka woos airlines for winter season flights


13 Sep 2026 | – By Shenal Fernando

• Discussions underway with airlines from key tourist markets
• Talks with Russian airlines ongoing; Japan next

Sri Lanka has begun discussions with several airlines from key tourist markets as it seeks to attract new carriers ahead of the upcoming winter season.

Speaking to The Sunday Morning Business, Deputy Minister of Ports and Civil Aviation Janitha Ruwan Kodithuwakku said that the ministry was engaging with airlines from several major tourist markets on the possibility of commencing operations to Sri Lanka during the upcoming winter season.

“We have commenced discussions with several Russian airlines on the possibility of launching operations to Sri Lanka. We will also begin discussions with Japanese airlines this month,” he said.

The Deputy Minister identified Air Japan as the Japanese carrier, noting that while discussions with the airline had yet to commence, Sri Lanka had expressed its interest to the carrier.

Meanwhile, he also told The Sunday Morning Business last week that he would travel to Australia that week to begin discussions with three airlines to explore the possibility of commencing flights to Sri Lanka.

Kodithuwakku said that the ministry was hopeful that at least one of these airlines would decide to commence operations.

The winter season represents the peak period for Sri Lanka’s tourism industry. According to data published by the Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority (SLTDA), the country welcomed more than 815,000 tourists during the peak winter months of December 2025 to February 2026.

Accordingly, Sri Lanka recorded 258,928 arrivals in December 2025, followed by 277,327 in January 2026 and 279,328 in February 2026.

During this period, India, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and Germany consistently ranked as Sri Lanka’s leading source markets, with China also featuring prominently.

Addition, not a replacement as far as I know.

Thanks for the update! Is this A330 joining as an addition to the fleet or as a replacement?

Hi Banu and All,

Sri Lankan Airlines (UL/ALK) is looking for another addition to their Wide-body fleet. Probably an used A330-243. As per rumours air-frame will be Ex-Garuda Indonesia one.
Possible Air-frames :PK-GPQ , PK-GPL , PK-GPM. Time frame of finalising this is not certain.

Vipul Misra has been appointed Acting Chief Executive Officer of SriLankan Airlines with effect from Sept. 9, the national carrier announced.
Misra brings more than two decades of experience in aircraft engineering and aviation leadership, having worked with several major commercial airlines, including Air India, Vistara, IndiGo, SpiceJet, Kingfisher Airlines and Air Deccan.

SriLankan Airlines said his experience across legacy, full-service and low-cost carriers is expected to provide technical and operational direction during the interim period.

The airline said the appointment comes as it works to improve its performance and long-term sustainability. (Newswire)

Sri Lanka and Oman Hold High-Level Aviation Discussions in Malaysia: Focus on Operations at Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport

September, 9, 2026

Sri Lanka and the Sultanate of Oman discussed further strengthening cooperation in civil aviation, with particular focus on the operation and development of Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, enhancing direct air connectivity and expanding airline services between the two countries.

The meeting took place in Kuala Lumpur at the 61st Conference of Directors General of Civil Aviation, Asia and Pacific Region (DGCA/61) between Capt. Daminda Rambukwella, Director General of Civil Aviation and Chief Executive Officer of the Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka (CAASL), and Eng. Naif bin Ali Al Abri, President of the Civil Aviation Authority of Oman.
A key focus of the discussion was Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport (MRIA), with Eng. Naif bin Ali Al Abri expressing interest in its operations and future development potential.

The two officials also discussed the resumption of direct flights between Sri Lanka and Oman through SriLankan Airlines, the possible resumption of Oman Air services between Muscat and Sri Lanka, and increasing the frequency of existing SalamAir services.

The expansion of air connectivity between the two countries is expected to support the growth of tourism, trade and business while strengthening people-to-people links between Sri Lanka and Oman.

Eng. Naif bin Ali Al Abri also requested Sri Lanka’s support for a special International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) meeting scheduled to be held in Oman. Sri Lanka expressed its willingness to provide the necessary support.

As part of efforts to further strengthen bilateral aviation relations, Eng. Naif bin Ali Al Abri invited the Minister of Ports and Civil Aviation, the Deputy Minister, the Secretary to the Ministry and Capt. Daminda Rambukwella to visit Oman. Capt. Daminda Rambukwella also extended an invitation to the Chairman of the Civil Aviation Authority of Oman to visit Sri Lanka.

The meeting further strengthened the foundation for closer Sri Lanka–Oman cooperation in civil aviation, airport development and international air connectivity.

UL resumed their CGK operations today with an A333 to clear the backlog.

SriLankan Airlines cancels Jakarta flights due to volcanic ash clouds

No info regarding the Lease extension of 4R-EXR.
Definitely the AC type should be A320 for sure.
Mid-September to Late-November is a Dead month for CMBDXB/DXBCMB sectors as usual. That is why UL is reducing their frequency.

There are alot of factors as to why alot of airlines aren't operating to CMB, but one of the main reasons is the lack of slots at CMB. That's why this government is so keen on trying to renovate Terminal 1 and to get Terminal 2 construction started up again, The total amount of passengers these two terminals can handle will be around 24 million passengers, CMB serves around 10 million per year with it's dilapidated terminal.

The main bottleneck here is the terminal, and I believe when terminal ones renovation is finished by next year, we will be able to have atleast increased frequencies and more airlines, but we also have to expand our parking space/gates as well to facilitate this growing demand.

And as far as I am aware, DrukAir had a proposal to launch flights from PHB to CMB last year, I have no idea if it took off or not. Pakistan and Sri Lanka also discussed on the possibility of increasing flights. With the current state of PIA, I hope they atleast launch flights from LHE or KHI. I have no idea about Ethiopian airlines, but they recently entered into an agreement with the Maldives on fifth freedom flights, and this included flights from MLE to CMB.

US Bangla is eyeing flights from DAC to CMB according to rumours, Biman is unlikely to start flights. Korean air and Oman air are unlikely to return this year, hopeful they will return next year.

Air Astana is set to return this December for its regular seasonal schedule.

Polish LOT airlines is ALSO planning to commence flights from WAW to CMB by 2027-2028.

But for now, we just have to hope and see. Sri Lanka needs to grow and it'll take time before airlines are keen to fly here, the majority of traffic is from the hubs in the middle east.

Thanks.

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It's great to see international airlines steadily launching services to Sri Lanka. However, I wonder why the airlines listed below haven't announced flights to Sri Lanka yet. There are also still no direct flights between CMB and JED. What are your thoughts?

Any updates on the following carriers serving Sri Lanka?

Saudia
​Biman Bangladesh Airlines
​Ethiopian Airlines
​Batik Air Indonesia
​Oman Air
​Korean Air
Maldivian
PIA
Himalaya Airlines
Air Astana

​Is there any chance Scoot will enter the SIN–CMB route, given that SQ is reducing frequency from 14 to 7 weekly flights starting late October?

​Also, is FZ not interested in resuming HRI flights via CMB? It seems SkyUp has completely stopped operating flights to HRI and is now only flying to Sri Lanka up to CMB in partnership with FZ. It also looks like Red Wings has pulled out of HRI.​

I'm also keen to know how FitsAir is performing on the AMD route, and how Jetstar, Vietjet, and Vietnam Airlines are performing on their CMB routes.